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SECTION 27A OF THE SECURITIES
EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934: DID CONGRESS
GRANT ITSELF NEW CONSTITUTIONAL
POWERS?
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the "'34
Act")' was enacted as a general antifraud provision making it un-
lawful to use manipulation or deception in the purchase or sale of
any security.2 Prior to 1991, no consistent statute of limitations
was applied to actions brought under section 10(b) because the
statutory language failed to provide for private causes of action.'
As a result, federal courts adopted and applied different limitation
periods from various statutes, 4 causing uncertainty and confusion
I See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78j(b) (West Supp. 1993).
This section provides, in relevant part:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any national
securities exchange-
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security regis-
tered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any manipu-
lative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations
as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or
for the protection of investors.
Id.
2 Id.
3 See, e.g., Lampfv. Gilbertson, 111 S. Ct. 2773, 2779 (1991) ("The text of§ 10(b) does not
provide for private claims. Such claims are judicial creation, having been implied under the
statute for nearly a half century."); see also Maclean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 380
(1983) (discussing implied rights under 1933 and 1934 Securities and Exchange Acts); Blue
Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 730 (1975) (discussing implied causes of
action under section 10(b)); Towner Petroleum Co. Sec. Litig., Nos. 84-4972, 84-5832, 1987
WL 7403, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 13, 1987) (characterizing private cause of action under
§ 10(b) as implied cause of action); Abelson v. Strong, 644 F. Supp. 524, 532 (D. Mass. 1986)
(discussing implied causes of action under section 10(b)); Kardon v. Nat'l Gypsum Co., 69 F.
Supp. 512, 514 (E.D. Pa. 1946) (providing private individuals with implied cause of action
under section 10(b)). See generally Alexander T. Galloway III, Note, Lampf v. Gilbertson:
The Wrong Answer to a Long-Awaited Question, 43 MERCER L. REv. 1307, 1309-10 (1992)
(discussing history of implied causes of action under § 10(b)).
4 See, e.g., Lampf, 111 S. Ct. at 2777 (Oregon District Court borrowed Oregon's statue of
limitations from fraud claims); Hirschler v. GMD Invest. Ltd. Partnership, No. 91-2087,
1992 WL 188143, at *2 (4th Cir. Aug. 7, 1992) (court borrowing limitation period from
Virginia's blue sky law); Short v. Belleville Shoe Mfg. Co., 908 F.2d 1385, 1386-87 (7th Cir.
1990) (borrowing statute of limitations and tolling provisions from state's blue sky laws),
cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2887 (1991); Reeves v. Teuscher, 881 F.2d 1495, 1501 (9th Cir. 1989)
(applying Washington's three year limitation period and tolling provision); Teamsters Lo-
cal 282 Pension Trust Fund v. Angelos, 815 F.2d 452, 454 (7th Cir. 1987) (borrowing stat-
ute of limitations from Illinois' state securities laws). See generally Harold S. Bloomenthal,
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regarding the applicable limitation period for section 10(b)
claims.5
In 1991, the Supreme Court attempted to resolve this long-
standing issue in Lampf v. Gilbertson.6 The Supreme Court held
that the applicable statute of limitations would be either one year
from discovery or three years after the section 10(b) violation.7
Subsequent case law required the Lampf decision to be applied
retroactively,8 resulting in the dismissal of many cases that would
have been timely under the prior system.9
Congress responded by enacting section 27A of the '34 Act,' °
The Statute of Limitations and Rule lOb-5: A Study in Judicial Lassitude, 60 U. Coro. L.
REV. 235, 238 (1989) (instructing federal courts to apply local statute of limitations in im-
plied causes of action grounded in federal law).
5 See Short, 908 F.2d at 1389. "This uncertainty and lack of uniformity promotes forum
shopping by plaintiffs and results in wholly unjustified disparities in the rights of different
parties litigating identical claims in different states. Neither plaintiffs nor defendants can
determine their rights with any certainty.'" Id. (quoting Committee on Federal Regulation
of Securities, Report of the Task Force on Statute of Limitations for Implied Actions, 41 Bus.
LAw. 645, 647 (1986)); Davis v. Birr, Wilson & Co., 839 F.2d 1369, 1370 (9th Cir. 1988).
"The absence of a uniform limitations period in such actions has been described by Judge
Easterbrook as 'one tottering parapet of ramshackle edifice. Deciding what features of state
periods of limitations to adopt for which federal statutes waste untold hours.'" Id. (quoting
Norris v. Wirtz, 818 F.2d 1329, 1332 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 943 (1987)); see
also Brief for Petitioner at 9, Lampf v. Gilbertson, 111 S. Ct. 2773 (1991) (No. 90-333). In
highlighting the confusion, the brief noted that "a 10(b) claim filed in the Eastern District
of Arkansas is subject to a one-year-from-discovery/three-years-from violation limitations
period borrowed from the 1934 Act.... However, an action filed in the Western District of
Arkansas is governed by a different limitations period." Id.; cf. Brief for Respondents at
n.18, Lampf (No. 90-333). Some states increased confusion by changing their own statute of
limitation periods. Id. See generally Bloomenthal, supra note 4, at 241. Certain states may
have as many as three applicable limitation periods to choose from. Id.
6 Ill S. Ct. 2773 (1991).
7 Id. at 2782. "Litigation instituted pursuant to section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 therefore
must be commenced within one year after discovery of the facts constituting the violation
and within three years after such violation." Id.
8 See James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 111 S. Ct. 2439, 2448 (1991). The
Supreme Court held that "[wihen the Court has applied a rule of law to the litigants in one
case it must do so with respect to all others not barred by procedural requirements or res
judicata." Id.
9 Lampf, 111 S. Ct. at 2785 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). "[Tihe court departs drastically
from our established practice and inflicts an injustice .... Quite simply the Court shuts the
courthouse door on respondents because they were unable to predict the future." Id. at
2785-86.
10 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 27A, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78aa-1 (West Supp. 1992). The
statute provides, in relevant part:
(a) Effect on pending causes of action:
The limitation period for any private civil action implied under section 78j(b) of this
title that was commenced on or before June 19, 1991, shall be the limitation period
provided by the laws applicable in the jurisdiction, including principles of retroactivity,
as such laws existed on June 19, 1991.
(b) Effect on dismissed causes of action:
Any private action implied under section 78j(b) of this title that was commenced on or
before June 19, 1991-
(1) which was dismissed as time barred subsequent to June 19, 1991, and
1993] SECTION 27A
which overturned the retroactive application of Lampf and pro-
vided for the reinstatement of the dismissed actions." Since its
inception, however, section 27A has repeatedly been challenged on
constitutional grounds with divergent results in the federal
courts.' 2 This sharp division has further added to the uncertainty
surrounding the applicable limitation period.
Part One of this Note traces the development of the statute of
limitations for section 10(b) claims, focusing on the confusion sur-
rounding this issue in the federal courts prior to the Lampf deci-
sion, and again, after the enactment of section 27A. Part Two ex-
amines the constitutional challenges to section 27A and analyzes
the rationale of those courts that have held section 27A constitu-
tional. Finally, this Note concludes that section 27A reinstates
the confusion that Lampf purported to end, but more importantly,
it argues that section 27A should be struck down because it is
unconstitutional.
I. DEVELOPMENT OF SECTION 10(b) STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
A. Prior to 1991
Beginning in 1946, private causes of action were found to be
valid under section 10(b) of the '34 Act.' 3 Since these private
(2) which would have been timely filed under the limitation period provided by the
laws applicable in the jurisdiction, including principles of retroactivity, as such laws
existed on June 19, 1991, shall be reinstated on motion by the plaintiff not later than
60 days after Dec. 19, 1991.
Id.
11 Id.
12 See, e.g., Treiber v. Katz, 796 F. Supp. 1054, 1062 (E.D. Mich. 1992) (section 27A un-
constitutionally attempts to reinstate cases in which final judgments were already en-
tered); Johnston v. CIGNA Corp., 789 F. Supp. 1098, 1102 (D. Colo. 1992) (section 27A
unconstitutionally attempts to overturn Supreme Court interpretation of unchanged law);
In re Brichard Securities Litigation, 788 F. Supp. 1098, 1112 (N.D. Cal. 1992) (section 27A
unconstitutionally violates separation of powers); TGX Corp. v. Simmons, 786 F. Supp. 587,
593 (E.D. La. 1992) [hereinafter TGX I] (section 27A unconstitutionally attempts to rein-
state previously dismissed actions). But see, e.g., Anixter v. Home Stake Prod. Co., 977 F.2d
1533, 1542 (10th Cir. 1992) (applying § 27A and reinstating plaintiffs claim); Henderson v.
Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 971 F.2d 1567, 1575 (11th Cir. 1992) (holding § 27A constitutional);
Cannistraci v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 796 F. Supp. 619, 622 (D. Mass. 1992) (section
27A does not violate separation of powers); Brown v. Hutton Group, 795 F. Supp. 1307,
1313-16 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (section 27A does not violate separation of powers or Equal Protec-
tion Clause); Lundy v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 794 F. Supp. 346, 347 (N.D. Cal. 1992) (sec-
tion 27A does not offend separation of powers doctrine); Venturetech II v. Deloitte, Haskins
& Sells, 790 F. Supp. 574, 576 (E.D.N.C. 1992) (section 27A doesn't violate separation of
powers, equal protection, or due Process); Axel Johnson, Inc. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 790
F. Supp. 476, 483 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (section 27A is "consistent with Separation of Powers and
Due Process requirements").
13 See, e.g., Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 514 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
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claims were implied in law,'4 the statute did not contain a statute
of limitations. 5 Under the directive of the Supreme Court in
Holmberg v. Armbrecht,1 6 lower courts considered the applicable
state law to ascertain the proper statute of limitations. 17
1. Application of State Statutes of Limitation
Initially, courts applied the statute of limitations of analogous
common-law fraud actions.' 8 Soon, a trend developed whereby the
courts began using limitation periods from state securities or
"blue sky" laws.' 9 Nonetheless, because of the broad scope of pos-
sible transactions that could fall under section 10(b),2 ° courts
"Where, as here the whole statute discloses a broad purpose to regulate securities ... in
view of the general purpose of the Act, the mere omission of an express provision for civil
liability is not sufficient to negative what the general law implies." Id.
14 See supra note 3 and accompanying text (citing cases finding private cause of action in
§ 10(b) implied in law).
15 See, e.g., Bath v. Bushkin, 695 F. Supp. 1156, 1159 (D. Wyo. 1988), affd in part, rev'd
in part, and vacated in part, 913 F.2d 817 (10th Cir. 1990). "Because an express, private
cause of action is not contained in Rule 10b-5, it is not surprising that no statute of limita-
tions provision was created to limit the time within which private 10b-5 actions may be
brought." Id.
16 327 U.S. 392 (1946).
17 Id. at 395. The Supreme Court noted that in the absence of an express federal period,
the limitations period from the most analogous statute of limitations would be borrowed.
Id. "As to actions at law, the silence of Congress has been interpreted to mean that it is
federal policy to adopt the local law of limitation." Id.
18 See, e.g., Volk v. D.A. Davidson & Co., 816 F.2d 1406, 1411-12 (9th Cir. 1987) (apply-
ing statute of limitations from Montana's fraud statute); Williams v. Sinclair, 529 F.2d
1383, 1387 (9th Cir. 1975) (borrowing limitation period from Oregon's fraud statute), cert.
denied, 426 U.S. 936 (1976); Buford White Lumber Co. Profit Sharing & Sav. Plan & Trust
v. Octagon Properties, Ltd., 740 F. Supp. 1553, 1567 (W.D. Okla. 1989) (borrowing limita-
tions period from Oklahoma's fraud statute); see also Bloomenthal, supra note 4, at 240
(discussing initial use of limitations periods from state common law fraud statutes).
19 See Bloomenthal, supra note 4, at 240 ("[A] trend developed to apply the blue-sky
period of limitations, generally using the doctrine of equitable tolling to determine when
the period began to run."); see also Smith v. Duff& Phelps, Inc., 891 F.2d 1567, 1570 (11th
Cir. 1990) (holding most analogous standard was Alabama's blue sky laws); Harris v.
Union Elec. Co., 787 F.2d 355, 360 (8th Cir.) (borrowing limitations period from Missouri's
blue sky law), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 823 (1986); Forrestal Village, Inc. v. Graham, 551 F.2d
411, 413 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (local blue sky law "best effectuates the federal policy"); Nortek,
Inc. v. Alexander Grant & Co., 532 F.2d 1013, 1015 (5th Cir. 1976) (applying local blue sky
law or that which bears "closest resemblance to the SEC section sued under"), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 1042 (1977) (borrowing from Florida's blue sky law); Alodex Corp. Sec. Litigation,
533 F.2d 372, 374 (8th Cir. 1976) (borrowing from Iowa's blue sky law); Umstead v. Dur-
ham Hosiery Mills, Inc., 578 F. Supp. 342, 347 (M.D.N.C. 1984) (borrowing North Caro-
lina's blue sky law as most analogous statute); Davis v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 635 F.
Supp. 707, 715 (W.D. La. 1986) (borrowing from Louisiana's blue sky law).
20 See, e.g., Lampf v. Gilbertson, 111 S. Ct. 2773, 2777 (1991) (limited partnerships in
computer software and equipment); Litton Industries, Inc. v. Lehman Brothers, Kuhn,
Loeb, Inc., 967 F.2d 742, 746 (2d Cir. 1992) (artificial inflation of corporate stock resulting
from insider trading); Hirschler v. GMD Investments, No. 91-2087, 1992 WL 188143, at *1
(4th Cir. Aug. 7, 1992) (limited partnership in 220 unit apartment complex); Short v. Belle-
ville Shoe Mfg. Co., 908 F.2d 1385, 1386 (7th Cir. 1990) (fraudulent representation concern-
1993] SECTION 27A
eventually began to look beyond state fraud and blue sky limita-
tion periods. 21 An overabundance of applicable limitation periods
developed, thus providing plaintiffs with the opportunity to "fo-
rum shop."22 As a result, the lack of a uniform limitation period
caused confusion, uncertainty, and judicial inefficiency among the
courts.2 3
2. Application of Federal Statutes of Limitation
In 1983, the Supreme Court decided DelCostello v. International
Brotherhood of Teamsters,24 which gave federal courts, in the ab-
sence of congressional direction, the power to move away from the
application of state limitation periods.25 The Supreme Court rea-
soned that if a federal law was more analogous than the state law,
the court should then apply the federal statutory period.26
Although this inaugural case did not involve a section 10(b) claim,
it nevertheless created another alternative which courts could fol-
low in the adjudication of 10(b) actions.2
ing stock valuation), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2887 (1991); Nesbit v. McNeil, 896 F.2d. 380,
380 (9th Cir. 1990) (churning of investment accounts); Brown v. Hutton Group, 795 F.
Supp. 1307, 1310 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (purchase of interest in oil and gas partnership); Ven-
turetech II v. Deloitte, Haskins & Sells, 790 F. Supp. 576, 579 (E.D.N.C. 1992) (misrepre-
sentation in connection with annual financial statements); Cohen v. Prudential-Bache Se-
curities, Inc., 777 F. Supp. 276, 277 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (limited partnership in hotel); Axel
Johnson, Inc. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 762 F. Supp. 599, 600 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (detrimen-
tal reliance on inadequate audit); Bath v. Bushkin, Gaims, Gaines, & Jonas, 695 F. Supp.
1156, 1158 (D. Wyo. 1988) (investment units in master videotapes of commercial television
programs).
21 See, e.g., Teamsters Local 282 Pension Trust Fund v. Angelos, 815 F.2d 452, 455 (7th
Cir. 1987) (borrowing from Illinois' securities law); Friedlander v. Troutman, Sanders,
Lockerman & Ashmore, 788 F.2d 1500, 1507 (11th Cir. 1986) (borrowing from Georgia's
securities act); Cahill v. Ernst & Ernst, 625 F.2d 151, 153 (7th Cir. 1980) (borrowing from
Wisconsin's securities laws).
22 Short, 908 F.2d at 1389 ("lack of uniformity creates forum shopping").
23 See id. at 1389. Because of the confusion "[v]ast amounts of judicial time and attor-
neys' fees are wasted." Id. (quoting from ABA Committee, supra note 5, at 647); Roberts v.
Magnetic Metals Co., 611 F.2d 450, 461 (3d Cir. 1979) (Seitz, J., dissenting). "Finally the
confusion is compounded ... ." Id. (emphasis added); see also supra note 5 and accompany-
ing text (describing confusion and waste among courts in determining applicable limita-
tions period).
24 462 U.S. 151 (1983).
25 Id. at 171-72 (without abandoning practice of federal courts borrowing from state law,
Supreme Court created an opportunity to look beyond state law to federal law).
26 Id. "[W]hen a rule from elsewhere in federal law clearly provides a closer analogy than
available state statutes, and when the federal policies at stake and the practicalities of
litigation make that rule a significantly more appropriate vehicle ... we have not hesitated
to turn away from state law." Id.
27 See supra note 25 and accompanying text (stating Delcostello created exception that
allowed courts to apply more analogous federal law).
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In re Data Access Systems Securities Litigation28 was the first
instance where a court applied a federal statute of limitations pe-
riod to a section 10(b) claim.29 In Data Access, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit premised its holding on the
determination made by the Supreme Court in Agency Holding
Corp. v. Malley-Duff Associates.30 Although Agency Holding recog-
nized the need for a uniform period of limitations for section 10(b)
actions,3 ' the Supreme Court failed to establish such a limitations
period.2 Therefore, the Data Access court held that the applicable
statute of limitations should be one year after discovery or three
years after the violation occurred.13 Despite the uniform applica-
tion of this standard by the Third Circuit, other circuits continued
to apply various state and federal limitation periods, thus further-
ing the need for Supreme Court intervention.3 4
B. The Lampf Decision
In 1990, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to Lampf v. Gil-
bertson35 to ascertian a uniform statute of limitations period for
section 10(b) actions.3 6 In Lampf, plaintiffs-respondents filed suit,
in the United States District Court for the District of Oregon,
claiming petitioners violated section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 with re-
spect to. the sale of limited partnership units. 7 The District Court
28 843 F.2d 1537 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 849 (1988).
29 Id. at 1550 (adopting one year after discovery or three years after violation limitation
period from express limitations sections of Securities Exchange Act of 1934).
30 483 U.S. 143 (1987).
31 Data Access, 843 F.2d at 1543-44. "This court has already recognized the necessity for
establishing a uniform limitations period when we resort to 'borrowing' state law.... We
therefore conclude ... the courts must select 'the one most appropriate statute of limita-
tions for all civil [§ 10(b) and Rule 10b-5] claims.'" Id. at 1544 (quoting Malley-DuffAssocs.,
Inc. v. Crown Life, 792 F.2d 341 (3d Cir. 1986)).
32 See id. "At the outset we recognize that the Supreme Court has to rule on the applica-
ble limitations period for section 10b and Rule 10b-5 action." Id.; see also Bloomenthal,
supra note 4, at 236 (discussing Supreme Court's refusal to address issue in late 1970 and
early 1980).
33 Data Access, 843 F.2d at 1550. "Accordingly we have decided that the proper period of
limitations for a complaint charging violation of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 is one year
after the plaintiff discovers the facts constituting the violation, and in no event more than
three years after such violation." Id.
34 See, e.g., Bath v. Bushkin, 913 F.2d 817, 819 (10th Cir. 1990) (remanding to district
court to apply most analogous state law); Nesbit v. McNeil, 896 F.2d 380, 384 (9th Cir.
1990) (rejecting Third Circuit's approach and applying Oregon state law).
35 498 U.S. 894 (1990) (granting certiorari).
36 See Lampf v. Gilbertson, 111 S. Ct. 2773, 2777 (1991). "In view of the divergence of
opinion among the Circuits regarding the limitations period for Rule 10b-5 claims, we
granted certiorari to address this important issue." Id. (footnote omitted).
37 Id. Plaintiffs-respondents purchased units in a limited partnership for the purpose of
1993] SECTION 27A
granted defendant's-petitioner's motion for summary judgment
because the plaintiffs'-respondents' claims were time-barred
under the two year Oregon fraud statute of limitations.38 On ap-
peal, the Ninth Circuit rejected plaintiffs'-respondents' argument
that a federal statute of limitations should be applied, but re-
versed the finding that factual issues still remained which pre-
vented summary judgment. 39 The Supreme Court granted certio-
rari in view of the conflicting decisions among the circuits
concerning the appropriate statute of limitations.40
In determining which statute of limitations should apply, the
Supreme Court found that if an action is implied in law, a court
should first look to the statute from which it emanates. 41 The ma-
jority concluded that "[wihen the statute of origin contains compa-
rable express remedial provisions, the inquiry usually should be
at an end. " 4'2 The Court then held that the applicable rule for 10(b)
and 10b-5 actions should be the one year after discovery or three
years after the violation period contained in other sections of the
'34 Act.43
When the Court applied this statutory period to the Lampf liti-
gants, it was required to apply the period retroactively to all other
similarly situated litigants.4 The retroactivity ruling was diC-
receiving federal income tax benefits. Id. at 2775. Petitioner assisted in the organization of
the partnership and prepared opinion letters concerning the investments. Id. After the
partnership failed and respondents were denied their tax benefits by the IRS, they filed
suit claiming petitioner made misrepresentations concerning the partnership in its opinion
letter. Id.
38 Id. at 2777. "[Tihe District Court granted summary judgment for the defendants on
the ground that the complaints were not timely filed.... The securities were governed by
the state statute of limitations for the most analogous forum-state cause of action. The
Court determined this to be Oregon's 2-year limitations period for fraud claims." Id. (cita-
tions omitted).
39 Id. "The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded the cases....
[T]he Court of Appeals found that unresolved factual issues as to when plaintiffs-respon-
dents discovered or should have discovered the alleged fraud precluded summary judg-
ment." Id. In selecting Oregon's two-year limitation period, the Ninth Circuit "implicitly
rejected petitioner's argument that a federal limitations period should apply." Id.
40 Id.
41 Lampf, 111 S. Ct. at 2780. "We conclude that where, as here, the claim asserted is one
implied under a statute that also contains an express cause of action with its own time
limitation, a court should look first to the statute of origin to ascertain the proper limita-
tions period." Id.
42 Id.
43 Id. at 2782.
44 See James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 111 S. Ct. 2439, 2446 (1991) (requiring
retroactive application of judicially announced rules when court announcing rule applied it
to litigants of that case); see also Henderson v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 971 F.2d 1567, 1569
(11th Cir. 1992) ("This circuit has recognized that Beam requires retroactive application of
the new statute of limitations rule announced in Lampf.").
614 ST. JOHN'S JOURNAL OF LEGAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 8:607
tated by the decision handed down the same day in James B.
Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia.45 Writing for the Court, Justice
David Souter stated "[w]hen the Court has applied a rule of law to
the litigants in one case, it must do so with respect to all others
not barred by procedural requirements or res judicata."46
C. Post-Lampf: The Confusion Continues
After the Lampf decision, it was believed that the confusion un-
derlying section 10(b) litigation had been put to an end.4 7 Federal
courts finally had a uniform and detailed limitation period to ap-
ply to 10(b) actions. 48 Because Lampf applied retroactively, many
complaints involving securities fraud claiming millions of dollars
in damages were dismissed prior to or during trial.4a The result of
being practically thrown out of the courthouse generated outrage
among defrauded investors throughout America.5 °
45 111 S. Ct. 2439 (1991). "Once retroactive application is chosen for any... new rule, it
is chosen for all others who might seek its prospective application." Id. at 2447-48.46 Id. at 2448. In his opinion, Justice Souter explained that a decision may be applied in
three ways. Id. at 2443. First, it may be applied retroactively to both "the parties before the
court and to all others by and against whom claims may be pressed." Id. Second, a decision
may be applied purely prospectively, that is, "applied neither to the parties in the law-
making decision nor to those others against, or by whom it might be applied to conduct, or
events occurring before that decision." Id. Under the purely prospective method "[tihe case
is decided under the old law but becomes a vehicle for announcing the new [law] .... " Id.
Finally, a "selectively prospective" application is a decision which applies to the litigants in
that case but is otherwise prospective for other similarly situated litigants. Id. at 2444. The
Beam Court held that selective prospectivity violates a basic rule of fairness because other
litigants, involved in cases having similar circumstances are deprived of a prospective con-
struction. Id.
47 See generally Dennis J. Block & Jonathan M. Hoff, Constitutionality of § 27A: Statute
of Limitations, N.Y.L.J., May 21, 1992, at 5, col. 1. "The Supreme Court's decision in
Lampf purported to end the considerable confusion and disagreement which had divided
the federal courts over the interpretation of the applicable limitation period for actions
implied under § 10(b)." Id.
48 See supra note 42 and accompanying text (discussing Lampf holding); see also Central
Bank v. Cleveland, Nos. 91-2784, 91-2785, 1992 WL 315117, at *2 (E.D. La. Oct. 19, 1992)
(relying on Supreme Court's decision on statute of limitations).
49 See 137 CONG. REC. S18624 (daily ed. Nov. 21, 1991) (statement of Sen. Bryan) (law-
suits totalling $652 million had already been dismissed, with motions pending totaling
$4.55 billion and another $1.21 billion expected to be filed); Howard Mintz, Legge Strikes
Grandfather Clause, THE RECORDER, Mar. 5, 1992, at 5 (discussing reinstatement of cases
thrown out of court as result of Lampf); Kevin G. Salwen, Many Securities-Fraud Suits Are
Likely to Go Unheard After High Court Ruling, WALL ST. J., Nov. 21, 1991, at A3 (discuss-
ing cases to be dismissed as result of Lampi).
50 See Lampf v. Gilbertson, 111 S. Ct. 2773, 2786 (1991) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
"Quite simply, the Court shuts the courthouse door on respondents because they were un-
able to predict the future." Id.; see also 137 CONG. REC. S18624 (daily ed. Nov 21, 1991)
(statement of Sen. Bryan). "Lampf changed the rules in the middle of the game for
thousands of fraud victims who already had suits pending-applying a shorter statute of
limitation than when they brought their suits." Id.
SECTION 27A
In an almost immediate response to Lampf, Congress enacted
section 27A of the '34 Act to resolve this frustration.5 1 On Decem-
ber 19, 1991, only six months after the Supreme Court decided
Lampf, President George Bush signed into law the provision 52 di-
recting courts to continue applying the statute of limitations ap-
plicable to section 10(b) claims in that state's jurisdiction before
Lampf, and allowing the previously displaced litigants to file mo-
tions within sixty days to reinstate their causes of action. 3 In this
capacity, Congress, in effect, assumed the role of a "super appel-
late court,"54 rendering the Supreme Court's decision a mere advi-
sory opinion.55
Initially, this congressional action was accepted by the federal
courts.5 6 However, in Bank of Denver v. Southeastern Capital
Group, Inc. ,7 the District Court for the District of Colorado de-
clared section 27A unconstitutional on the ground that Congress
had violated the separation of powers doctrine .5  Following Colo-
rado's lead, other district courts began to declare section 27A un-
constitutional.5 9 Once again, section 10(b) litigants found them-
selves amid the confusion and uncertainty that had prevailed in
prior years.60  These events allowed section 10(b) litigants to
again become forum shoppers, providing them with some cer-
51 See supra note 10 (citing § 27A).
52 See Block & Hoff, supra note 47, at 5. 'The legislation was signed into law by Presi-
dent Bush on December 19, 1991 and is codified as Section 27A of the Exchange Act." Id.
53 See supra note 10 (citing § 27A).
54 Bank of Denver v. Southeastern Capital Group, Inc., 789 F. Supp. 1092, 1097 (D. Colo.
1992). "Congress thus effectively acted as a 'super-appellate court,' overturning Lampf
without replacing that decision with any new law." Id.
55 In re Brichard Sec. Litig., 788 F. Supp. 1098, 1103 (N.D. Cal. 1992). "Such congres-
sional review would also undermine Article III in that it would transform judgments into
advisory opinions and thereby subject their finality." Id.
56 See Anixter v. Home-Stake Prod. Co., 977 F.2d 1533, 1547 (10th Cir. 1992) (holding
§ 27A constitutional); Henderson v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 971 F.2d. 1567, 1575 (11th Cir.
1992) (same); Cannistraci v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 796 F. Supp. 619, 622 (D. Mass.
1992) (same); Brown v. Hutton Group, 795 F. Supp. 1307, 1316 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (same);
Axel Johnson, Inc. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 790 F. Supp. 476, 483-84 (S.D.N.Y 1992)
(same).
57 789 F. Supp. 1092 (D. Colo. 1992).
58 Id. at 1098. "I hold that [§ 27A] violates the principle of the separation of powers and
is, therefore unconstitutional." Id.
59 See, e.g., Treiber v. Kat., 796 F. Supp. 1054, 1062 (E.D. Mich. 1992) (holding § 27A
unconstitutional); Johnston v. CIGNA Corp., 789 F. Supp. 1098, 1102 (D. Colo. 1992)
(same); Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 789 F. Supp. 231, 235 (E.D. Ky. 1992) (same);
Brichard, 788 F. Supp. at 1112 (same); TGX I, 786 F. Supp. 584, 587 (E.D. La. 1992)
(same).
60 Block & Hoff, supra note 47, at 10. "For now, however, the uncertainty continues to
grow concerning the constitutionality of § 27A as well as the applicable statute of limita-
tions for § 10(b) actions filed prior to June 20, 1991." Id.
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tainty as to which courts will or will not honor section 27A as a
means of reinstating their causes of action. Despite three circuit
courts declaring section 27A constitutional,6 ' the Supreme Court
must address this issue and determine the constitutionality of sec-
tion 27A and more importantly, whether Congress will be allowed
to assume this "super appellate role."
II. CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES
Since its enactment, the constitutionality of section 27A has
been challenged on the grounds that it violates: the separation of
powers between the legislative and the judicial branches;62 the
Fifth Amendment guarantee of due process; 63 and the Fifth
Amendment guarantee of equal protection. 64
A. Separation of Powers
Congress violates the separation of powers doctrine when it en-
acts legislation that intrudes upon the constitutionally reserved
powers of the judicial branch. 5 Three different challenges have
been made against section 27A based on the separation of powers
doctrine. 6 The first challenge argues that section 27A directs
courts to decide a particular group of cases in a certain manner
which contravenes the Klein doctrine.6 ' Another argument main-
61 See Brening v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 990 F.2d 272, 277 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding
§ 27A constitutional); Anixter v. Home Stake Prod. Co., 977 F.2d 1533, 1542 (10th Cir.
1992) (same); Henderson v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 971 F.2d 1567, 1575 (11th Cir. 1992)
(same).
62 See, e.g., Anixter, 977 F.2d at 1544-46 (addressing claim that § 27A violates separa-
tion of powers doctrine); Henderson, 971 F.2d at 1573 (same); Rabin v. Fivzar, 801 F. Supp.
1045, 1053-54 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (same); Treiber, 796 F. Supp. at 1059 (same); Adler v. Berg
Harmon Assoc., 790 F. Supp. 1235, 1243-44 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (same); Axel Johnson, Inc. v.
Arthur Andersen & Co., 790 F. Supp. 476,483-84 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (same); Johnston, 789 F.
Supp. at 1099 (same); Bank of Denver v. Southeastern Capital Group, Inc. 789 F. Supp.
1092, 1097 (D. Colo. 1992) (same); Brichard, 788 F. Supp. at 1112 (same).
63 See, e.g., Anixter, 977 F.2d at 1546 (addressing due process challenge); Rabin, 801 F.
Supp. at 1055-56 (same); Treiber, 796 F. Supp. at 1062 (same); Adler, 790 F. Supp. at 1244-
45 (same); Plaut, 789 F. Supp. at 235 (same); TGX Corp. v. Simmons, Nos. 87-5298, 90-
0849, 1992 WL 125365, at *1 (E.D. Ky. May 20, 1992) [hereinafter TGX II] (same).
64 See, e.g., Henderson, 971 F.2d at 1574 (addressing challenge to § 27A based on equal
protection); Brown v. Hutton Group, 795 F. Supp. 1307, 1316 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (same); Weg-
breit v. Marley Orchards Corp., 793 F. Supp. 965, 970 (E.D. Wash. 1992) (same).
65 See Brichard, 788 F. Supp. at 1102 (discussing judiciary's role of handing out judg-
ments, which Congress cannot re-examine).
66 See generally Block & Hoff, supra note 47, at 10 (explaining separation of power chal-
lenges that have been raised).
67 See, e.g., Johnston v. CIGNA Corp., 789 F. Supp. 1098, 1102 (D. Colo. 1992) (section
27A "compels a result" by directing federal courts to ignore Supreme Court's interpreta-
tion); Bank of Denver v. Southeastern Capital Group, 789 F. Supp. 1092, 1097-98 (D. Colo.
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tains that section 27A conflicts with the Supreme Court's holding
in Beam because it allows similarly situated litigants to be treated
differently.68 The third challenge asserts that section 27A(b),
which provides for the reinstatement of claims dismissed after
Lampf, conflicts with the exclusive power of the courts to adjudi-
cate cases.69
1. Violation of the Klein Doctrine
If Congress disagrees with the judicial interpretation of a stat-
ute, it has the power to repeal or amend the law. 70 Additionally,
Congress can affect pending litigation by requiring retroactive ap-
plication of the changed law.71 This power is not considered abso-
lute and in 1871, it was limited by United States v. Klein.72 In
Klein, the Supreme Court held that Congress may not "prescribe a
rule of decision" for cases pending before the courts without first
amending or repealing the underlying law.73 Several district
1992) (section 27A "prescribes a rule of decision" in violation of Klein doctrine); Brichard,
788 F. Supp. at 1104-07 (section 27A "directs a rule of decision by intruding on the adjudi-
cative process"). But see, e.g., Rabin, 801 F. Supp. at 1054 (section 27A does not violate
Klein but rather "specifies the law to be applied to the relevant cases and leaves to the
courts the job of applying that law to the particular facts before them"); Treiber, 796 F.
Supp. at 1058-59 (section 27A does not direct courts to make particular findings of fact, and
therefore, does not violate Klein doctrine); Brown, 795 F. Supp. at 1313-14 (same); Adler,
790 F. Supp. at 479-80 (explaining that § 27A is unlike statute in Klein); TGX I, 786 F.
Supp. 587, 592 (E.D. La. 1992) (section 27A does not "implicate the separation of powers
principles established by Klein"); Hindler v. Telequest, No. 89-0847, 1992 WL 158631, at *1
(S.D. Cal Mar. 31, 1992) (section 27A does not violate Klein doctrine).
68 See Brichard, 789 F. Supp. at 1109 (section 27A conflicts with Beam rule by permit-
ting selectively prospective application of new statute of limitations); TGX 1 786 F. Supp. at
592 ("[s]ection 27A contravenes constitutional mandate established in Beam"). But see
Anixter v. Home-Stake Prod. Co., 977 F.2d 1533, 1547 (10th Cir. 1992) (selective prospec-
tivity not declared unconstitutional by Beam); Rabin, 801 F. Supp. at 1054 (same); Brown,
795 F. Supp. at 1315 (same).
69 See Block & Hoff, supra note 47, at 10 (stating congressional review of final judgments
offends separation of powers doctrine by intruding upon courts' exclusive power to adjudi-
cate cases).
70 See, e.g., Henderson v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 971 F.2d 1567, 1571 (11th Cir. 1992).
"If Congress disagrees with the Supreme Court's interpretation, it is free to amend the
statute as it sees fit." Id.; Bank of Denver, 789 F. Supp. at 1096. "Congress has a constitu-
tional means to alter judicial interpretation of a statute-it can repeal or amend the law."
Id.; see also Block & Hoff, supra note 47, at 5. "Congress may constitutionally alter judicial
interpretation of a statute." Id.
71 See Bank of Denver, 789 F. Supp. at 1096. "Congress can affect indirectly the outcome
of pending litigation." Id.; Block & Hoff, supra note 47, at 5. "Congress generally has the
power to repeal or amend the law even after federal courts have already rule on it, and can
even require the courts to apply such changes retroactively, thereby indirectly affecting the
outcome of pending litigation." Id. (footnotes omitted).
72 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1871).
73 Id. at 146-47. In Klein, the Supreme Court held that a congressional enactment, which
advised the courts not to consider a pardon as evidence of loyalty during the Civil War, was
618 ST. JOHN'S JOURNAL OF LEGAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 8:607
courts have found that section 27A violates the Klein doctrine be-
cause it directs courts to decide a certain group of cases in a par-
ticular manner without amending the underlying limitation pe-
riod for section 10(b) claims announced in Lampf.7 4
The purpose of section 27A was to overturn the retroactive ef-
fect of Lamp f 5 The retroactive application of the statute of limi-
tations announced in Lampf was the result of the rule announced
in the Beam decision.76 The underlying laws Congress could have
amended in order to change this result were the Lampf or the
Beam holdings. Congress did neither.7
Section 27A did not provide a new limitation period for section
10(b) claims.78 Although the legislators originally intended to
change the Lampf rule,79 an agreement could not be reached on a
unconstitutional. Id. at 147-48. The Court stated that Congress violated the separation of
powers doctrine by requiring the courts to characterize a pardon as evidence of disloyalty,
when the Court had already held it to be proof of loyalty. Id. at 146-48. The Court found
that the "great and controlling purpose" of the statute was to deny the effect that the Court
had given to a pardon. Id. at 145-46.
74 See supra note 67 and accompanying text (citing cases which analyzed § 27A under
the Klein doctrine).
75 See, e.g., Rabin v. Fivzar, 801 F. Supp. 1045, 1047 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (section 27A pro-
scribed retroactive application of Lampf rule); Treiber v. Katz, 796 F. Supp. 1054, 1056
(E.D. Mich. 1992) (section 27A was "an apparent attempt to counteract the retroactive ap-
plication of Lampf'); Adler v. Berg Harmon Assoc., 790 F. Supp. 1235, 1237 (S.D.N.Y. 1992)
(section 27A was enacted to modify retroactive application of Lampf); see also 137 CONG.
RE c. S17725 (daily ed. Nov. 22, 1991) (statement of Sen. McCain) (section 27A "eliminates
the retroactive application of [LamptI decision"); Richard L. Jacobson, Turning Down the
Lampf: Is Exchange Act Section 27A Constitutional, 6 Insights (P-H) No. 4, at 36 (Apr.
1992) ("This statute overrules numerous decisions by lower federal courts to the effect that
Lampf should be given retroactive application."); Carroll E. Neesemann, The State of the
Law, in SECURITIES ARBrMATION 1992, at 403 (PLI Corp. Law and Practice Course Hand-
book Series No. 781, 1992) (section 27A eliminated retroactive application of Lamp/).
76 See supra notes 44-46 and accompanying text (explaining that Beam required that
Lampf decision be applied retroactively).
77 See In re Brichard Sec. Litig., 788 F. Supp. 1098, 1103 (N.D. Cal. 1992). "[T]he section
did not enact any underlying substantive law.... What section 27A did was to say that the
Lampf rule should not, contrary to the Beam and Lampf decisions of the Supreme Court, be
applied by the federal courts to existing cases." Id.
78 Johnston v. Cigna Corp., 789 F. Supp. 1098, 1102 (D. Colo. 1992) (Congress did not
change law but overturned Supreme Court decision); Bank of Denver v. Southeastern Capi-
tal Group, Inc., 789 F. Supp. 1092, 1097 (D. Colo. 1992) (stating Congress overturned
Lampf without replacing decision with new law); Brichard, 788 F. Supp. at 1103 (section
27A "did not enact a statute of limitations. . ., but left the Lampf rule untouched."); Block
& Hoff, supra note 47, at 5 ("It is clear from the language of § 27A that Congress neither
codified the limitations period adopted in Lampf nor established a new limitations period to
govern all pending and future § 10(b) cases.").
79 See Brichard, 788 F. Supp. at 1104. In reviewing the legislative history surrounding
§ 27A, Judge Legge stated:
Two bills to change the statute of limitations announced in Lampf were proposed. Sen-
ator Byran [sic] and Representative Markey introduced separate bills that would have
enacted a limitations period longer than the one-year/three-year rule announced in
Lampf, and that also would have "eliminate[d] the retroactivity of the Lampf decision,
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suitable limitation period, and section 27A was the result of a
political compromise."0 While drafting section 27A, Congress was
pressured to remedy the harsh consequences of the Lampf holding
before the end of the congressional session."' Under this compro-
mise, the limitation period annouced in Lampf was impliedly
adopted by Congress in section 27A8 2 and only its retroactive ap-
plication was limited. 3
Furthermore, section 27A did not amend the rule announced in
Beam.8 4 In Beam, the Supreme Court rejected "selective prospec-
tivity" of judicially announced rules.8 5 Under "selective prospectiv-
ity," a court would apply a new rule to the litigants at bar, while
not applying the rule retroactively to cases commenced prior to
that decision. 6 But according to Beam, once a judicially created
allowing suits underway to move forward under the new time limit rule."
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting 137 CONG. REc. S10691 (daily ed. July 23, 1991) (state-
ment of Sen. Bryan)).
80 137 CONG. REC. S17305-17306 (daily ed. Nov. 21, 1991) (statement of Sen. Riegle).
Senator Riegle stated:
[W]e had a controversy in the area with respect to the Lampf decision. I want to say in
that area, Senator Bryan and Senator Domenici have worked steadily to resolve those
issues. I thank them both for that effort. It would allow the Lampf decision to be set
aside so there would, in fact, be a legal reachback to cover cases that have been filed in
the way of alleged fraud, fraudulent activities. That is a very important provision of
the bill and we have reached a compromise on [it] that settles that issue.
Id. (emphasis added).
81 Id. "We have to enact this bill today, in my view in terms of the time schedule, so that
we are in a position to meet our resposibilities, go to conference, and get this legislation in
place. The President has asked us to do this on an urgent basis." Id.; see also 137 CONG.
REc. S18522 (daily ed. Nov. 26, 1991) (statement of Sen. Domenici). "We are nearing the
end of the session.... Were it not the end of the session I would have insisted on taking the
Senate's time to fully consider these issues." Id.; Salwen, supra note 49, at A3. -he Bush
Administration... has agreed to support the pending legislation, only if it includes provi-
sions to block what the administration considers frivolous suits." Id.
82 See Brichard, 788 F. Supp. at 1104. "The limitations periods of Lampf are impliedly
approved by Congress' taking no action to codify or change those rules." Id.; see also 137
CoNG. REC. S18522 (daily ed. Nov 26, 1991) (statement of Sen. Domenici). "Under our
agreement we will postpone until next year the issue of necessary changes to section 10(b)
including the appropriate statute of limitations and measures to reduce meritless litiga-
tion." Id.
83 See supra note 75 and accompanying text (explaining that § 27A limited retroactive
application of Lampf); see also 137 CONG. REc. S18623 (daily ed. Nov. 27, 1991) (statement
of Sen. Bryan) ("I am pleased that Congress is overturning the most egregious part of the
Court's decision.").
84 See Block & Hoff, supra note 47, at 10. Section 27A does not change the principles of
retroactivity set forth in Beam, it only precludes the application of Beam's principles to the
statute of limitations adopted in Lampf. Id.
85 See James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 111 S. Ct. 2439, 2448 (1991) (stating it is
error to to not apply a rule of law retroactively when the case that announced the rule has
already done so); see also supra notes 8, 44 and accompanying text (stating and explaining
Beam holding).
86 See Beam, 111 S. Ct. at 2448 (discussing that under selective prospectivity "a court
[would] apply a new rule in the case in which it is pronounced, then return to the old [rule]
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rule is applied to the litigants in that case, it must also be applied
to all similarly situated litigants.8 7
Congress expressed no dissatisfaction with the Beam rule itself
when it enacted section 27A, but it wanted to prevent its applica-
tion to the Lampf decision.88 Essentially, section 27A, without
changing either holding, instructs courts to disregard Beam's ap-
plication to the Lampf decision. 9
Relying on the Supreme Court's recent decision in Robertson v.
Seattle Audubon Society,90 the Seventh Circuit, in Berning v. A.G.
Edwards & Sons,9 the Tenth Circuit, in Anixter v. Home-Stake
Production Co.,92 and the Eleventh Circuit, in Henderson v. Scien-
tific-Atlanta, Inc.,9 have held that section 27A does not violate
the Klein doctrine.
In Robertson, environmental groups challenged the proposed
timber harvesting of certain forests in which the northern spotted
owl, an endangered species, lived.94 As a result of this ongoing liti-
gation, Congress enacted new harvesting requirements and re-
strictions, which stated that compliance with these new require-
ments would be adequate to meet the requirements of the statute
that was at the center of the litigation.95 The environmental
groups challenged the constitutionality of the new statute, claim-
ing it directed the results in their pending cases.96
In Robertson, the Supreme Court held that the statute was not a
with respect to all [other cases] arising on facts predating the pronouncement"); see also
supra note 46 and accompanying text (explaining three different ways courts can apply
new rules).
87 Beam, 111 S. Ct. at 2448.
88 See supra note 84 and accompanying text (stating § 27A prevents application of Beam
to Lampf rule).
89 Id.; see Johnston v. CIGNA Corp., 789 F. Supp. 1098, 1102 (D. Colo. 1992). "Congress'
great and controlling purpose was not to change the law but to overturn a Supreme Court
decision with which it did not agree." Id.; In re Brichard Sec. Litig., 788 F. Supp 1098, 1103-
04 (N.D. Cal. 1992). Congress did not change any statute of limitations, but limited the
retroactive application of the limitation period from Lampf. Id.
90 112 S. Ct. 1407 (1992).
91 990 F.2d 272 (7th Cir. 1993).
92 977 F.2d 1533 (10th Cir. 1992).
93 971 F.2d 1567 (11th Cir. 1992).
94 Robertson, 112 S. Ct. at 1410. The groups challenged the federal goverment's allow-
ance of the harvesting and sale of timber from forests in the Pacific Northwest. Id. The
environmentalists claimed that the harvesting would kill the northern spotted owl, a bird
listed as a threatened species under the Endangered Species Act of 1973. Id.
95 Id. at 1410-11. Congress enacted § 318 of the Department of the Interior and Related
Agencies Appropriations Act which directed that compliance with this statute would satisfy
the requirements of another statute that was being litigated in Robertson. Id. at 1410.
96 Id. at 1412 (environmental groups claimed "subsection (bX6)(A), because it purported
to direct the results in two pending cases, violated Article III).
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violation of the separation of powers because it "compelled
changes in law, not findings or results under old law."97 The Court
also stated that the statute did not "direct any particular findings
of fact or applications of law, old or new, to fact.""8 The circuit
courts, relying on this language, reasoned that because section
27A also did not direct findings of fact, then it did not violate the
Klein doctrine.99 However, the Court's decision in Robertson was
based on the fact that the statute amended the underlying law,
and not on its failure to direct factual findings. ' 00 Therefore, Rob-
ertson did not narrow the Klein doctrine by only requiring that a
statute direct findings of fact to be considered a violation of the
separation of powers and the circuit courts erred in their analyses
of this issue by relying on this language.
Alternatively, regardless of whether Robertson does reqire that
a statute "direct ... findings of fact or applications of law, old or
new, to fact" to be considered a violation of the Klein doctrine, sec-
tion 27A must still be found unconstitutional. It is evident that
section 27A directed "applications of law, old or new, to fact".101
The statute directs courts to ignore the Supreme Court's decision
in Lampf and to apply the prior limitation periods. ' 0 2 Accordingly,
under either interpretation of Robertson, section 27A violates the
97 Id. The Court held that "subsection (b)(6)(A) replaced the legal standards underlying
the two original challenges with those set forth in subsections (b)(3) and (b)(5), without
directing particular applications under either the old or new standards." Id. at 1413.
98 Id.
99 See Anixter v. Home-Stake Prod. Co., 977 F.2d 1533, 1545 (10th Cir. 1992) (upholding
§ 27A because it does not direct courts to make specific factual findings); Henderson v.
Scientific Atlanta, Inc., 971 F.2d 1567, 1573 (11th Cir. 1992) ("The Act does not require
courts to make any particular findings of fact or applications of law to fact."). For decisions
relying on this statement, see Rabin v. Fivzar Assoc., 801 F. Supp. 1045, 1054 (S.D.N.Y.
1992) (asserting that "nothing in § 27A purports to direct any particular findings of fact");
Treiber v. Katz, 796 F. Supp. 1054, 1058 (E.D. Mich. 1992) ("Admittedly, section 27A may
change the eventual outcome of pending cases, but because it does not direct courts to make
particular findings in those cases, it does not run afoul of the constitutional limitation de-
scribed in Klein."); Adler v. Berg Harmon Assoc., 790 F. Supp 1235, 1243 (S.D.N.Y. 1992)
("Under Robertson,..., a law will not be found to be unconstitutional, even where it may
effect the outcome of a case, unless it directs particular findings.").
100 See Robertson, 112 S. Ct. at 1414. "Because we conclude that [the statute] did amend
applicable law, we need not consider whether [the lower court's] reading of Klein is correct."
Id.
101 Johnston v. CIGNA Corp., 789 F. Supp. 1098, 1102 (D. Colo. 1992). Section 27A "com-
pels a result under the unchanged provisions of § 10(b)-namely, it directs federal courts in
a discrete body of pending cases to ignore the Supreme Court's binding interpretation of
§ 10(b)." Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Robertson, 112 S. Ct. at 1413).
102 Id.; see Bank of Denver v. Southeastern Capital Group, 789 F. Supp. 1092, 1097 (D.
Colo. 1992). "Congress selected a discrete category of federal cases, those pending on June
19, 1991, and directed federal courts hearing these cases to ignore the Supreme Court's
binding interpretation of § 10(b) set out in Lampf" Id.
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separation of powers.
2. Direct Contravention of Beam
A second separation of powers challenge to section 27A is that
the statute directly contravenes the Supreme Court's holding in
Beam, which rejected selective prospectivity of judicially an-
nounced federal rules.'013 In Lampf, the new uniform statute of
limitations for section 10(b) claims was applied to the litigants in
that case. 104 Therefore, according to Beam, this new rule must be
applied retroactively to all cases commenced before the Lampf de-
cision. By refusing to follow Beam's mandate of retroactivity, 10 5
section 27A causes a selectively prospective application of the new
statute of limitations. 106 As a result, section 27A causes similarly
situated litigants to be treated differently, directly conflicting with
the Beam holding.'0 7
The separation of powers doctrine encompasses the notion that
the Supreme Court is "the final expounder of the Constitution."'0 8
Thus, Congress cannot enact a statute contrary to the Court's con-
stitutional doctrine.' 0 9 To avoid this issue, several district courts
have argued that the Beam decision was not based on the Consti-
103 See In re Brichard Sec. Litig., 788 F. Supp. 1098, 1108-12 (N.D. Cal. 1992). In his
opinion, Judge Legge stated:
Beam forbade the selective prospective application of new judicially announced federal
rules and required their retroactive application. Section 27A replaces the Beam deci-
sion against selective prospectivity with a law of selective prospectivity in certain
cases. Permitting selective prospective application of statutes of limitations after the
Beam court constitutionally forbade selective prospective application of such rules is
an attempt to change Beam.
Id. at 1109; see also TGX I, 786 F. Supp. 587, 592-94 (E.D. La. 1992) ("Section 27A contra-
venes the constitutional mandate in Beam."). But see Rabin, 801 F. Supp. at 1054 (assert-
ing that Beam is not based on constitutional principles); Brown v. Hutton Group, 795 F.
Supp. 1307, 1315 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (same); Adler, 790 F. Supp. at 1243 ("This Court... does
not read Beam as disapproving of the selective prospectivity principle on constitutional
grounds."). See generally Block & Hoff, supra note 47, at 10 (examining issue of whether
§ 27 unconstitutionally contravenes Beam).
104 See Lampf v. Gilbertson, 111 S. Ct. 2773, 2782 (1991). After determining that the
applicable statute of limitations for § 10(b) claims was one year from discovery or three
years from the violation, the Supreme Court stated that "[als there is no dispute that the
earliest of plaintiff-respondents' complaints was filed more than three years after petition-
ers alleged misrepresentations, plaintiff-respondents' claims were untimely." Id.
105 See supra note 8 (stating holding of Beam).
106 See supra note 103 (stating § 27A causes selective prospectivity).
107 See TGX I, 786 F. Supp. at 592 (section 27A is "inconsistent with the constitutional
mandate established in Beam").
108 In re Brichard Securities Litig., 788 F. Supp. 1098, 1109 (N.D. Cal. 1992).
109 See id. at 1108. 'The Supreme Court, and not Congress, has the final word on the
meaning of the Constitution." Id.; TGX I, 786 F. Supp. at 594. "[Tlhe [Supreme] Court is
the ultimate arbiter of the constitution." Id.
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tution, but rather was based on the principles of "equality" and
"stare decisis." 110 These courts have reasoned that since retroac-
tivity in civil cases was founded on these common-law principles,
and not the Constitution, Congress had the power to change the
rule.11 ' Courts following this reasoning ultimately found section
27A constitutional. 1
12
This argument is flawed, as the Court's decision in Beam was,
in fact, based on the Constitution. While Justice Souter's opinion
in Beam did not explicitly refer to the Constitution as the basis for
his decision, 3 his reliance on the principle of "equality" through-
out the opinion suggested a constitutional analysis based on the
Equal Protection Clause." 4 Furthermore, Justice Souter's opinion
relied heavily on the Supreme Court's earlier decision in Griffith
v. Kentucky, 1 5 where selective prospectivity in the criminal con-
text was abandoned on constitutional grounds. 116 According to
110 See Rabin v. Fivzar Assoc., 801 F. Supp. 1045, 1054 (S.D.N.Y. 1992). The court re-
jected the defendant's argument that Beam was constitutionally grounded. Id.; Adler v.
Berg Harmon Assocs., 790 F. Supp. 1235, 1243-44 (S.D.N.Y. 1992). In Adler, Judge Conner
reasoned that the Beam decision was not based on the Constitution because:
Only three Justices out of nine found a constitutional basis for the Court's conclusion
that selective prospectivity of judicial decisions was impermissible-Justices Black-
mun, Marshall and Scalia found that retroactive application of judicial decisions is
required by Article III of the Constitution. Justice Souter, writing for the Court and
joined by Justice Stevens, stated that "selective prospectivity... breaches the principle
that litigants in similar situations should be treated the same, a fundamental compo-
nent of stare decisis and the rule of law generally." Justice Souter viewed the retroac-
tivity issue very narrowly, as "an issue of choice of law" and refused to speculate as to
the bounds or propriety of pure prospectivity.
Id. (quoting James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 111 S. Ct. 2439 (1991)). But see
Brichard, 788 F. Supp. at 1111 (stating that Beam was decided on constitutional grounds);
TGX I, 786 F. Supp. at 594 (discussing that constitutional mandate of Beam cannot be
contravened by Congress).
111 See Jacobson, supra note 75, at 2 (judicially-created common law rules may be
changed by Congress).
112 See supra note 103 (citing cases that found Beam not based on Constitution).
113 See Beam, 111 S. Ct. at 2448 (stating grounds for Beam decision were confined to
issue of choice of law); TGX I, 786 F. Supp. at 593 (explaining that "Justice Souter did not
explicitly reference article III [of the Constitution]").
114 See Beam, 111 S. Ct. at 2446 (relying on the "equality principle, that similarly situ-
ated litigants should be treated the same"); Brichard, 788 F. Supp. at 1110 (noting Beam
opinion referred to principles of "equity" and 'equality"); TGX I, 786 F. Supp. at 593 (stat-
ing that Justice Souter recognized "inequity inherent in selective prospectivity"); see also
Jacobson, supra note 75, at 2 ("Because the notion of'equality,'... is suggestive of an equal
protection of the laws analysis, the constitutional underpinnings of Beam are not free from
doubt.").
115 479 U.S. 314 (1987).
116 See id. at 322-23. According to the Court, "[f]ailure to apply a newly declared consti-
tutional rule to a criminal case pending on direct review violates basic norms of constitu-
tional adjudication." Id. at 322; see also Brichard, 788 F. Supp. at 1110. Justice Souter's
heavy reliance on Griffith is significant. Id.; TGX I, 786 F. Supp. at 593. Justice Souter's
reliance on Griffith confirms Beam was based on constitutional principles. Id.
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Justice Souter, the "equality principle, that similarly situated liti-
gants should be treated the same," actually has greater force in
the civil context." 7 Also, in a concurring opinion, written by Jus-
tice Antonin Scalia and joined by Justices Harry Blackmun and
Thurgood Marshall, it was clearly asserted that selective prospec-
tivity is prohibited by the Constitution, thus furthering the consti-
tutional overtones of Beam.""
3. Reinstatement of Dismissed Claims
Section 27A(b) allows for the reinstatement of claims dismissed
after Lampf.1 9 However, congressional reversal of final judg-
ments intrudes upon judiciary powers and offends the separation
of powers doctrine. 120 If this were permitted, litigants would avoid
final judgments by appealing to Congress and a court's decision
would become "nothing more than an advisory opinion." 12 1 There-
fore, section 27A violates the separation of powers doctrine.
B. Due Process: Vested Rights Doctrine
The reinstatement of dismissed claims under section 27A(b) has
also been challenged as a violation of due process. 122 Congress
lacks the power to take away rights once those rights are vested in
a final judgment. 123 In 1898, in McCullough v. Virginia,12 4 the
117 Beam 111 S. Ct. at 2446. "Griffith cannot be confined to the criminal law. Its equality
principle, that similarly situated litigants should be treated the same, carries comparable
force in the civil context. Its strength is in fact greater in the latter sphere." Id. (citations
omitted).
118 See id. at 2450 (Scalia, J., concurring) (selective prospectivity is "impermissible sim-
ply because it is not allowed by the Constitution"); see also id. at 2449 (Blackmun, J., con-
curring) (selective prospectivity violates Constitution).
119 See supra note 10 and accompanying text (citing § 27A(b)).
120 Brichard, 788 F. Supp. at 1102. "The prohibition against allowing Congress to dis-
rupt final decisions of the courts is 'consistent with separation of powers' because it 'pro-
tects judicial action from superior legislative review.'" Id. (quoting Georgia Ass'n of Re-
tarded Citizens v. McDaniel, 855 F.2d 805, 810 (11th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1090
(1989)); see also Block & Hoff, supra note 47, at 10. Congressional review of final judgments
offends the doctrine of the separation of powers because it intrudes upon the courts' exclu-
sive power to adjudicate cases. Id.
121 Block & Hoff, supra note 47, at 10 (Congressional reversal of final judgments "trans-
forms the judicial decision into nothing more than an advisory opinion."); see also Brichard,
788 F. Supp. at 1103 (congressional review "would transform judgments into advisory opin-
ions and thereby subvert their finality").
122 See supra note 63 and accompanying text (citing cases addressing due process chal-
lenge); see also Block & Hoff, supra note 47, at 10 ("Courts ... have found that the rein-
statement of § 10(b) claims pursuant to § 27A(b) not only eviscerates the fundamental prin-
ciple of finality of judgments, but also deprives private litigants of their vested rights in a
final judgment.").
123 See McCullough v. Virginia, 172 U.S. 102, 123-24 (1898) (holding Congress may not
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Supreme Court held that although legislation may effect subse-
quent proceedings and pending actions, "when those actions have
passed into judgment, the power of the legislature to disturb the
rights created thereby ceases." 125 The reasoning behind this prohi-
bition is that a final judgment fixes the rights of the parties, and
any congressional disturbance of these rights would constitute an
unlawful taking of property without compensation. 126
It has been argued that a judgment based upon a statute of limi-
tations defense does not create a vested right, and therefore, a re-
versal of such a judgment does not violate a defendant's right to
due process.' 27 In Adler v. Berg Harmon Associates, 28 the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York relied
on this reasoning and determined that the McCullough rule "does
not apply where the judgment was not based upon the merits of
the claim, but instead was the result of the application of the de-
fense of statute of limitations, a mere technical rule."129 This ar-
gument was adopted from the Supreme Court's holding in Chase
disturb rights after they pass into judgment); Massingill v. Downs, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 758,
767 (1849) ("[N]o legislative act can change the rights and liabilities of parties, which have
been established by a solemn judgment."); Johnston v. CIGNA Corp., 789 F. Supp. 1098,
1100 (D. Colo. 1992) ("[L]itigants have vested rights in final judgments and... Congress
has no power to take away those vested rights through later legislation.').
124 172 U.S. 102 (1898).
125 Id. at 124.
126 Block & Hoff, supra note 47, at 10. "When final judgment has been entered, the
rights of the parties have been fixed, and legislative modification amounts to an unlawful
taking in violation of the Fifth Amendment guarantee of Due Process.' Id.; see also Plaut v.
Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 789 F. Supp. 231, 234 (E.D. Ky. 1992). Legislative modification may
amount to an unjustified taking. Id.
127 See, e.g., Anixter v. Home-Stake Prod. Co., 977 F.2d 1533, 1546 (10th Cir. 1992)
(judgment based on statute of limitations defense does not create a vested right); Adler v.
Berg Harmon Assoc., 790 F. Supp. 1235, 1244 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (timeliness defense never
considered fundamental right); Venturetech II v. Deloitte, Haskins & Sells, 790 F. Supp.
574, 576 (E.D.N.C. 1992) (section 27A(b) does not violate due process because "[sitatutes of
limitations do not create vested rights'); Bankard v. First Carolina Communications, Inc.,
No. 89-C8571, 1992 WL 3694, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 6,1992) (section 27A does not deprive
defendant of any vested right). But see, e.g., Treiber v. Katz, 796 F. Supp. 1054, 1061 (E.D.
Mich. 1992) ("defendants do have vested rights in this Court's judgment dismissing Plain-
tiffs' § 10(b) claims"); Plaut, 789 F. Supp. at 235 ("When a judgment becomes final, it is
final for all purposes, regardless of its basis.'); TGX II, Nos. 87-5298, 90-0849, 1992 WL
125365, at *1 (E.D. La 1992) (asserting defendant has vested right in judgment based on
statute of limitations defense).
128 790 F. Supp. 1235 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
129 Id. at 1244; see also Axel Johnson, Inc. v. Arthur Anderson & Co., 790 F. Supp. 476,
482 (S.D.N.Y. 1992). The Axel Johnson court noted that the sole reason for dismissal of the
plaintiffs case was artificial and technical, having nothing to do with its merits. Id. "Legis-
lation to alter such a technical defense, and its application even to dismissed cases, goes far
less to the heart of the judicial function than would a legislative attempt to reverse adjudi-
cations which had addressed the true merits of the disputes in question.' Id. at 483.
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Securities Corp. v. Donaldson.13 0 In Chase, the Court held that
modification of a statute of limitations which restored a remedy
that was time-barred did not violate due process.13 ' However, in
Chase, the action was still pending, and therefore, the Court was
not disturbing a final judgment. 132 Further, the Court specifically
stated that the case was "not one where a defendant's statutory
immunity from suit had been fully adjudged so that legislative ac-
tion deprived it of a final judgment in its favor."133
Despite this distinction, courts have specifically focused on the
Chase Court's statement that the "shelter [of a statute of limita-
tions] has never been regarded as what now is called a 'fundamen-
tal' right ... of the individual." 34 Therefore, those courts which
construe Chase to mean that a judgment based on a statute of lim-
itations does not create a vested right are incorrect. Although a
defendant does not have a vested right in a statute of limitations
defense, the Supreme Court has not stated that there is no vested
right in a final judgment based on a statute of limitations de-
fense. 135 Once the lawsuit is finally adjudicated, Congress cannot
disturb the final judgment upon which it was based.136 Therefore,
section 27A(b) violates the Due Process Clause by stripping away
a right vested in a final judgment.
In concluding that Congress has the power to upset a final judg-
ment based on a statute of limitations defense, courts have also
relied on the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Sioux
130 325 U.S. 304 (1945).
131 Id. at 315. According to Chase, statutes of limitations are justified by necessity and
convenience, not logic. Id. at 314. "[Tlhe history of pleas of limitation shows them to be good
only by legislative grace and to be subject to a relatively large degree of legislative control."
Id. For cases where courts have determined that a final judgment based on a statute of
limitations defense does not create a vested right, see Anixter, 977 F.2d at 1546 (relying on
Chase to determine final judgment based on statute of limitations defense did not create
vested right); Adler, 790 F. Supp. at 1244-45 (judgment based on statute of limitations does
not create vested right); Axel Johnson, 790 F. Supp. at 482-83 (same).
132 See Chase, 325 U.S. at 306 (while case was pending, legislature enacted new statute
of limitations); see also Block & Hoff, supra note 47, at 10 (stating that claims in Chase,
affected by new statute of limitations, had not been dismissed at time new statute was
enacted).
133 Chase, 325 U.S. at 310.
134 Id. at 314; Adler, 790 F. Supp. at 1244-45 (relying on language espoused in Chase);
Axel Johnson, 790 F. Supp. at 482-83 (quoting Chase language).
135 See Treiber v. Katz, 796 F. Supp. 1054, 1061 (E.D. Mich. 1992). "Even though defend-
ants do not have vested rights in a particular statute of limitation, defendants do have
vested rights in this Court's judgment dismissing [pilaintiffs' § 10(b) claims. Once a suit is
finally adjudicated, the rights become vested and Congress cannot constitutionally divest
them." Id.
136 Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 789 F. Supp. 231, 235 (E.D. Ky. 1992).
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Nation of Indians.17 Courts have determined that Sioux Nation
established that relitigation of adjudicated claims may be author-
ized by Congress. 131 In Sioux Nation, the Supreme Court reasoned
that Congress had the power to enact legislation that waived the
effect of a final judgment, which was based on a statute of limita-
tions defense. 139 The statute in Sioux Nation, however, was an ac-
knowledgment by the government of its own obligation to pay for
the taking of property, despite previous final judgments in its
favor.' 40 In other words, the government allowed the parties to
relitigate the claims even though it had a final judgment based on
a statute of limitations defense. 4 ' Section 27A(b), on the other
hand, did upset the final judgments of private litigants, rendering
the holding in Sioux Nation inapplicable. 42 Therefore, courts
have incorrectly relied on Sioux Nation as permission for Con-
gress to upset final judgments of private litigants by allowing for
the reinstatement of section 10(b) claims.
C. Equal Protection
Section 27A has also been challenged on the ground it violates
the Fifth Amendment guarantee of equal protection because it
causes similarly situated litigants to be treated differently.143 A
statute, which doesn't affect a fundamental right or create a sus-
pect classification, will withstand an equal protection challenge as
long as it is rationally related to a legitimate governmental inter-
137 448 U.S. 371 (1979).
138 See Anixter v. Home-Stake Prod. Co., 977 F.2d 1533, 1546 (10th Cir. 1992) (case
closely resembles Sioux Nation); Axel Johnson, 790 F. Supp. at 481 (asserting Sioux Nation
establishes that Congress can authorize relitigation of decided claims).
139 See Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. at 407. "Congress' mere waiver of the res judicata effect of
a prior judicial decision rejecting the validity of a legal claim against the United States... 
was not unconstitutional. Id.
140 See Treiber v. Katz, 796 F. Supp. 1054, 1061 (E.D. Mich. 1992). Sioux Nation is lim-
ited to Congress's "power to recognize and pay the nation's debts." Id. "The Supreme Court
determined that the legislation in Sioux Nation did not bring into question the finality of
... earlier judgments, but only acknowledged the government's obligation to pay compen-
sation for takings of property." Id.
141 See Axel Johnson, 790 F. Supp. at 481 (statute in Sioux Nation "merely operated as a
waiver of an available defense by an interested party").
142 See Treiber, 796 F. Supp. at 1061. "The present legislation does not seek to waive a
defense enuring to the government's benefit; Section 27A(b) purports to waive a defense
enjoyed by private litigants." Id.
143 See supra note 64 and accompanying text (citing cases in which equal protection ar-
gument has been addressed). See generally Block & Hoff, supra note 47, at 10 (explaining
basis of equal protection challenge).
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est. 144 Parties opposing section 27A have argued that under the
statute their liability depends upon arbitrary classifications, such
as when the claim was filed, with respect to Lampf, and in which
jurisdiction the claim was brought. 145 In other words, the date the
claim was filed dictated to the courts whether to apply the new
uniform statute of limitations announced in Lampf or the old stat-
ute of limitations applicable in the jurisdiction prior to Lampf.14 6
In addition, for those claims filed prior to Lampf, the applicable
statute of limitations varied depending on the jurisdiction in
which the claim was brought.147
Those courts considering this argument have rejected it, finding
that the classifications created by the statute serve a rational gov-
ernmental purpose. 14 The goal of Congress in enacting the stat-
ute was to protect those plaintiffs whose section 10(b) claims were
dismissed because they were commenced prior to the Lampf deci-
sion. Section 27A was a rational way to achieve that goal. 149 Ac-
cordingly, section 27A does not violate the Equal Protection
Clause.
The constitutional challenges to section 27A are that it violates
the separation of powers doctrine, the Due Process Clause, and
the Equal Protection Clause. In conclusion, it is asserted that sec-
tion 27A violates the separation of powers doctrine and the Due
Process Clause. Additionally, it is argued that even though Con-
144 Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97 (1979). A statute does not violate equal protection
"unless the varying treatment of different groups or persons is so unrelated to the achieve-
ment of any combination of legitimate purposes that we can only conclude that the legisla-
ture's actions were irrational. Id.
145 See, e.g., Henderson v. Scientific-Atlanta Inc., 971 F.2d 1567, 1574 (11th Cir. 1992)
(defendant argued that under § 27A liability depends on residence and whether case was
filed before Lampf); Brown v. Hutton Group, 795 F. Supp. 1307, 1311 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (de-
fendants assert statute is irrational and creates arbitrary classifications between similarly
situated litigants); Wegbreit v. Marley Orchards Corp., 793 F. Supp. 965, 970 (E.D. Wash.
1992) ("defendants object to the fact that imposition of liability under § 10(b) may depend
upon the jurisdiction in which the claim was pending... and whether it was filed before or
after Lampf').
146 See supra note 10 and accompanying text (citing text of § 27A).
147 Id.
148 See Henderson, 971 F.2d at 1574. It is not irrational that applicable statutes of limi-
tation vary from one jurisdiction to another. Id. "Because section 27A does not affect a
fundamental right or discriminate on the basis of a suspect classification, the statute is due
to be upheld so long as it is rationally related to furthering a legitimate interest." Id.;
Brown, 795 F. Supp. at 1311. "Congress had a rational basis for applying section 27A only
to those claimants who filed claims prior to... the date Lampf was decided." Id.; Wegbreit,
793 F. Supp. at 970. The distinctions made by § 27A serve a rational purpose.
149 Brown, 795 F. Supp. at 1316-17. "Congress had a legitimate legislative purpose, to
protect the reasonable expectations of those claimants who filed prior to Lampf, that was
furthered by enacting section 27A-" Id.
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gress was attempting to effectuate legitimate public policy goal,
the Supreme Court, as protector of the Constitution, must hold
section 27A unconstitutional in view of the long-term effects this
policy will have on the Court's power.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court adopted a uniform statute of limitations in
Lampf to end the confusion and uncertainty surrounding the ap-
plicable statute of limitations for section 10(b) claims. However,
as a result of the retroactive application of this new limitation pe-
riod, the claims of many section 10(b) litigants who commenced
their actions prior to the Lampf decision were rendered untimely.
To remedy the harshness of this result Congress enacted section
27A. This statute was immediately challenged on constitutional
grounds. This enactment allowed Congress to impermissibly in-
trude into the exclusive domain of the judiciary and took away
rights of litigants that were vested in final judgments. Further,
the Supreme Court must readdress this issue in order to resolve
the confusion created by section 27A, and more importantly, to de-
cide whether Congress will be permitted to assume the role of
"super-appellate court."
Norman Cole Williams & Katherine M. Zehmisch
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